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1 Introduction
Currently, the issue of immigration is one of the central challenges faced by European
states, and immigration policy has become a top political priority. Pressure has increas-
ingly come from right-wing populist parties that have emerged in several countries
over the past decade. Xenophobic discourses and defensive immigration policies are
at the centre of these parties' political programmes and electoral success. In the light
of shifting political landscapes, fluctuating national identities, and widespread anti-
immigrant attitudes, many European states have responded by adopting stricter policies
of immigration control (Kofman, 2002). Switzerland is no exception. In fact, since the
end of the 19th century, Switzerland has had a long tradition of right-wing populism,
which has mainly formed around the issue of Uë berfremdung: the idea of foreign
overpopulation threatening Swiss identity.
The role played by state discourses in the portrayal of citizens and of those
considered unsuitable for citizenship (Yuval-Davis, 1997) is currently of much scholarly
interest. The notion of `discourse' refers to groups of statements which structure the
way something is thought about, and the way we act on the basis of that thinking.
Discourse is powerful because it is productive. Discourses `naturalise' and often
implicitly universalise a particular view of the world and position subjects within it
(Foucault, 1980; Gregory, 2002, page 78). State discoursesöthe ways of portraying
citizens and those unsuitable for citizenship, via official documents, white papers,
legislation, political rhetoric, and other documents, texts, and forms of representation
(McDowell, 2003)öare particularly powerful discourses. Their dominance occurs not
only because they are located in socially powerful institutions but also because they
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claim absolute truth (Foucault, 1980). For van Dijk (2004, page 15), the discourses of
the political elite are particularly important, `` because their legislative or policy-making
positions place them in the crucible of discursive power and influence, namely there
where discourse is not merely empty words, but has the direct force of law and
regulation.'' Studying state discourse is, for van Dijk, an important means of under-
standing how prejudice, discrimination, and racism are produced. He maintains that
the socioeconomic conditions of inequality of labour and of colonial immigrants in
Europe have been sustained and legitimised by state discourse.
Studying state discourse is also essential for understanding the construction and
maintenance of national identities. Unity is an overriding characteristic of the nation
and is constantly being recreated by the state through performance and representation
(Walter, 1999). State discourses are the official means of representation and play an
important role in fostering collective unity and in maintaining the idea of the nation-
state. State discourses shape and sustain national identities through narratives of the
`self' and `other' (Somers, 1994). Indeed, the constitution of the `self' is centred against
an `other': national identities are produced not only through processes that foster a
sense of sameness but also through those that emphasise a differentiation from the
`other' (Valentine, 2001). Policies and discourses on immigrants can be interpreted as
`` one dimension of nation-building'' (Schnapper, 1992, page 17). The arbitrary construc-
tion of foreigners as `different to us' has the function of reinforcing national identity
(Tabin, 2004). The study of state discourses regarding immigrants opens a particularly
fruitful avenue for the study of the associations between identity and territory, and
their relationship to nationality, nationalism, and citizenship (McDowell, 2003).
Switzerland is a particularly interesting case for studying the relationship between
national identity, citizenship, and social exclusion. Switzerland has one of the largest
percentages of foreigners in the world. Foreigners constitute 22% of the population in
Switzerland, which is nearly four times more foreigners than France, and three times
more than Germany, Austria, and the United States (OECD, 2005); however, the high
percentage of foreigners is not the result of a high rate of absolute immigration but of
citizenship laws based on the principle of blood-based descent (jus sanguinis) rather
than on place of birth (jus soli) and of restrictive naturalisation practices. In fact, half
of the 1.5 million `foreigners' living in Switzerland either were born and raised in the
country, or have lived there for more than fifteen years (Swiss Federal Statistics Office,
2001, page 19, 27). In 1998, with a rate of 1.4%, Switzerland had the lowest number of
naturalisation in Europe after Germany. Switzerland's reluctance to recognise itself as
a country of immigration and to grant citizenship rights to immigrants is characteristic
of countries with a `guest-worker' tradition, such as Germany and Austria. In opposi-
tion to c`lassical' countries of immigration, such as the United States and Canada,
where admission policies have been oriented to mass immigration with the intention
of granting citizenship rights to the newcomers, guest-worker countries have imported
temporary foreign labour without any intention of making them full members of society
(Leitner, 1995). Excluding foreigners from citizenship has allowed Swiss populations to
cultivate the feeling of having a unique identity (Tabin, 2004). Switzerland is also of
special interest because although it is true that it is a rare case of successful multiethnic
nation building it is also true that it has given rise to a segregated relationship between
nationals and foreigners (Wimmer, 2002).
Recent studies of European immigration policies have argued that, despite steps
towards the `Europeanisation' of immigration policies, the national state continues to
be the most influential entity in the determination of migrants' rights (for example,
Kofman, 2002; Morris, 2001). Indeed, many studies have focused on the specific
situation of individual states but have focused almost exclusively on countries belonging
2
to the European Union (EU) (for example, McDowell, 2003; Morris, 2001; Schuster
and Solomos, 1999; Sciortino, 2000; Staples, 1999; Thierry, 2000). So far, little attention
has been given to European nations not belonging to the EU, such as Switzerland.
Although much of the Swiss literature has focused on immigration policies, there has
been little focus on studying policies as state discourse.
The aim of this paper is to address the literature gap by examining Swiss state
discourses on immigrants. The study is based on the perspective of critical discourse
analysis, `` an approach that specifically focuses on the role of discourse in the reproduc-
tion of power, dominance and inequality'' (van Dijk, 2004, page 20). Consequently, in
this paper we examine the role of Swiss state discourses on immigrants in the produc-
tion and maintenance of structures of inclusion and exclusion, whereby `inclusion' is
defined as equality of rights and opportunities. In order to gain such an insight, our
more specific aim is to analyse state discourse as formulated and legitimised in
legislation on immigration and on citizenship. The reason for choosing these two sets
of law is because they complement each other in defining the characteristics and
position of immigrants in society: who they are, which ones are allowed into the
country, and what the conditions for an immigrant to become a full member of society
are. We focus on `foreigner' law rather than on `immigration' law because, in contrast
to countries where jus soli is the norm, Swiss legislation is based on the concept of
`foreigners' rather than that of `immigrants', and thus does not have an immigration
policy but a law on foreigners. Asylum legislation has not been included in this study.
In Switzerland, foreigner and asylum law are two completely separate sets of legisla-
tion, and they are both quite complex. Including asylum law would be beyond the
scope of this analysis.
The practical study of state discourse focuses on three dimensions of analysis: the
discourse itself, the context of discourse, and the historical events surrounding dis-
course. In the first dimension the analysis of discourse consists of examining legal texts
containing policies on foreigners and nationality, complemented by official position
papers, politicians' speeches, and the home pages of relevant government institutions.
The following questions are addressed: how do legal texts `speak' about foreigners?
What kind of relationship do they construct between national populations and the
foreign `other'? What are the implications of official discourses for the social integra-
tion of foreigners in Swiss society? What position is assigned to foreigners in society?
What are the ultimate functions of state discourses on foreigners? In the second
dimension the context analysis is based on the idea that state discourses are not
independent formulations but rather a result of competing and contradictory forces
in society (Foucault, 1980). Such forces result from the diverse interests of groups and
individuals acting in various arenas of society at the national and international levels:
political (such as political parties, international governments, social movements), eco-
nomic (for example, industrial associations and industry representatives), and cultural
(such as scientists and the media). The contextual analysis is based on the following
questions. What forces have been particularly successful in influencing the formulation
of Swiss state discourses on foreigners? And how can their success be explained? The
third dimension of the analysis, the historical perspective, is based on the idea that
discourses are not static but vary over space and time (Blunt, 1999). Thus, the historical
analysis examines shifts in policies and state discourses of foreigners in Switzerland
from the end of the 19th century up to today. The analysis is supported by a review of
published material on the history of immigration policymaking (Arlettaz and Burkart,
1988; Caroni, 2004; D'Amato, 2001; Haug, 1980; Jost, 1998; Kury, 2002; Mahnig and
Piguet, 2003; Sarasin, 2005; Steiner and Wicker, 2004; Tabin, 2004; Tanner, 1998;
Wicker, 2003).
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2 Historical shifts in state discourses regarding foreigners
State constructions of foreigners and immigration and naturalisation policies have
significantly changed in Switzerland from the country's first wave of immigration in
the 19th century up to today. The interaction of several forces and events seem to have
influenced those shifts, including most notably: the country's transformation from a
rural to an industrial economy, the outbreak of the two world wars, the postwar
economic growth, and the recent emergence of the EU. Four main periods have been
identified in this paper regarding the discursive construction of foreigners: (a) before
the First World War, a time of industrial expansion during which foreigners were seen
as indispensable for the country's economic development: (b) from the First to the
Second World War, when a national c`ulture of threat' developed and foreigners were
conceptualised as a danger to Swiss identity; (c) after the Second World War, when
economic expansion required foreign labour and foreigners were constructed as a
temporary phenomenon; and (d) from the 1990s to today, a phase of rapprochement
to the EU, where the concept of c`ultural proximity' was employed to portray foreign-
ers as either c`ulturally close' or c`ulturally distant' to the Swiss and to legitimise
granting EU citizens privileged rights of entry and settlement.
2.1 Prior to the First World War: foreigners as indispensable for economic development
Industrialisation in Switzerland began around 1850. Up until then, Switzerland had
been a poor nation with high numbers of people leaving the country mainly because of
its scarce agricultural and mineral resources. Industrialisation introduced a need for
foreign labour, both skilled and unskilled. Both civil society and the government
perceived foreigners as indispensable for the country's economic development. The
positive conceptualisation of foreigners led to an open immigration policy whereby
foreign nationals were willingly admitted into the country, Europeans in particular, as
long as they behaved `properly' and did not represent a threat to the country (Caroni,
2004, page 3). The Swiss government signed recruitment agreements with its neighbouring
countries, and consequently French and German immigrants entered the country to lead
industrial development and Italian workers arrived to help built the necessary infrastruc-
ture for industrial expansion. Bilateral agreements were based on the principle of the free
movement of labour, which gave foreign nationals the same rights as national citizens,
except for voting rights. Swiss citizenship was made available to immigrants after two
years of residence (Caroni, 2004; D'Amato, 2001). The government estimated that
Table 1. Foreigners in Switzerland according to continent of origin 1900 ^ 2003 (source: Swiss
Federal Statistics Office, 2004, page 93).
Total Europe a Africa America Asia b Stateless
1900 383 424 380 719 231 2 107 367
1910 552 011 547 447 417 2 994 1 153
1920 402 385 398 459 589 2 862 655
1930 355 522 350 696 488 3 381 957
1941 233 554 216 640 313 1 331 701 4 659
1950 285 446 271 948 600 4 040 2 261 6 597
1960 584 739 552 725 1 945 10 828 4 537 14 704
1970 1 080 076 1 042 352 5 113 18 419 9 345 4 827
1980 944 974 889 995 11 039 20 455 23 182 303
1990 1 245 432 1 125 437 24 768 30 357 64 143 727
2003 1 623 586 1 383 352 64 894 59 793 112 241 3 207
a Includes Turkey.
b Includes Australia and Oceania.
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facilitating naturalisation was the most suitable way for foreigners to become `assimilated'
into Swiss culture (D'Amato, 2001; Wicker, 2003).
The liberal immigration policies resulted in the rapid increase in the foreign pop-
ulation. The numbers of foreign nationals increased from 150 000 in 1870 to 552 000 in
1910 (see tables 1 and 2 on the development of numbers of foreigners between 1900
and 2003). Thus, at the beginning of the 20th century 15% of Switzerland's resident
population was made up of foreign nationals, a number that represented the highest
rate of foreigners in Europe at the time (Arlettaz and Burkart, 1988). In response to
the high numbers of foreigner, a negative reaction developed among Switzerland's
conservative political and cultural elite. As historians have shown (Jost, 1992; Tanner,
1998), some politicians, writers, and scientists started disseminating discourses
about the foreigners' threat such as the following: ``We are also being invaded by
barbarians ... . Those Slavs, Greeks, South Americans and Orientals are all like big
uncivilised children ... . Only, if we were strong enough to impose our culture on them''
(de Reynold, 1909, page 261). French and German managers, Italian workers, and
Russian students were seen as representatives of a new society characterised as `` cosmo-
politan'' and `` exotic'' (Arlettaz and Burkart, 1988, page 163). Foreigners were viewed
as transmitters of non-Swiss morals and ideas, which threatened the traditional Swiss
Table 2. Foreigners from the European continental area according to country of origin 1900 ^
2003 (source: Swiss Federal Statistics Office, 2004, page 93).
Europe Germany France Italy Austria
total
1900 380 719 168 451 58 522 117 059 23 433
1910 547 447 219 530 63 695 202 809 37 639
1920 398 459 149 833 57 196 134 628 21 680
1930 350 696 134 561 37 303 127 093 20 095
1941 216 640 78 274 24 396 96 108 a
1950 271 948 55 437 27 470 140 280 22 153
1960 552 725 93 406 31 328 346 223 37 762
1970 1 042 352 118 289 55 841 583 855 44 734
1980 889 995 87 913 47 570 418 989 32 135
1990 1 125 437 86 197 52 715 383 204 30 172
2003 1 383 352 151 094 71 638 311 957 34 665
Portugal Spain Ex- Other Turkey
Yugoslavia European
countries
1900 74 679 b 12 279 222
1910 147 971 b 22 136 520
1920 155 1 102 b 32 901 964
1930 114 1 316 1 081 27 582 736
1941 63 1 051 648 15 725 375
1950 173 1 212 892 23 741 590
1960 386 13 524 1 169 28 282 645
1970 3 632 121 237 24 971 77 578 12 215
1980 18 943 107 510 60 916 77 393 38 626
1990 110 312 124 127 172 777 84 278 81 655
2003 164 725 78 660 367 869 120 651 82 093
a Figures included in Germany.
b Figures included in ‘Other European countries’.
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way of life (Arlettaz and Burkart, 1988, page 163). The `foreigner' question became a
national issue. The debate revolved around Swiss identity begin put in danger.
2.2 After the First World War to the Second World War: foreigners as a threat to Swiss identity
The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 dramatically changed the positive con-
ceptualisation of foreigners that had prevailed until the end of the 19th century.
Foreigners started to be interpreted as a danger and the notion of `Uë berfremdung'ö
the idea by which excessive numbers of foreigners could threaten Swiss identity and a
term coined in Switzerlandömade its way into public discourse. Right-wing politicians
used this discourse before and after the war to exacerbate nationalist feelings among
the population. Curiously, Uë berfremdung was the result of an ideological construction
and not of a demographic reality. The numbers of foreigners in Switzerland actually
decreased during the war (see table 1), but politicians used statistical extrapolations,
instead of actual census statistics, to make their case for Uë berfremdung (Arlettaz and
Burkart, 1988). Interestingly, the notion of Uë berfremdung also emerged in public
discourse in Germany and Austria but never became as influential as it was in
Switzerland (Kury, 2002).
The fear of Uë berfremdung led to a paradigm shift in immigration policies. Supported
by popular vote, the government issued the Federal Law on the Settlement and Residence
of Foreigners (ANAG), which aimed at protecting the country from Uë berfremdung, in
1932 (Arlettaz and Burkart, 1988). The liberal spirit of prewar immigration policies was
abandoned: the civil rights of foreigners were restricted; they were no longer entitled to
permanent residence in the country, and, from then on, the notion of foreigner, rather than
that of immigrant, was to prevail. The aims stated in the law (still in force in 2006) were to
avoid the entry and settlement of `undesirable' people into the country, to stabilise the job
market, to protect Swiss nationals from unemployment, and to control the ratio of
foreigners to Swiss within the population (Federal Assembly of the Swiss Confederation,
1931). The concept of Uë berfremdung made its official entry into legislation language
and became the basis for subjective decisions on which foreigners were allowed to
enter the country: Article 16 of the ANAG stated that `` officials granting foreigner
permits need to take into account the intellectual and economic interests of the country
as well as the degree of Uë berfremdung.'' In practice, immigrants were selected on the
basis of ethnic criteria and, similarly to many other European countries, Jews were
particularly discriminated against (Kury, 2002).
In 1939 the Second World War broke out. A national c`ulture of threat' developed
during that time, which aggravated the existing negative view of foreigners. The origins
of the culture of threat were to be found in the Geistige Landesverteidigung, an ideology
that emerged in Switzerland during the 1930s. This ideology, developed by various
groups in civil society, was conceived as a mental strategy of defence against the threat
of Nazi and Fascist regimes in neighbouring Germany and Italy. The strategy aimed at
defending (supposedly) `typical' Swiss values, such as cultural diversity, democracy, and
freedom, and was meant to be the task of the individual and not of the state. In this
ideology, the enemy was represented as someone from abroad who pretended to
infiltrate the minds of the Swiss in order to destroy Swiss values. The practical
consequence of this ideology was a cultural withdrawal reflex which developed among
many Swiss and which led them to close to foreign influence and to revert to Swiss
values. This attitude is commonly known in Switzerland as the `hedgehog mentality',
which was to prevail between the 1930s and the early 1970s (Sarasin, 2005).
2.3 After the Second World War into the 1980s: foreigners as a temporary phenomenon
The postwar period saw an economic expansion in Switzerland, and a renewed short-
age of domestic labour, particularly for unskilled and semiskilled labour. Similar to
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other European countries, such as Germany and Austria, a recruitment of labour
ensued based on the seasonal-worker system. Switzerland concluded a recruitment
agreement in 1948 with the Italian authorities. In order for the government to attend
to both the economic need for foreign labour and the fear of Uë berfremdung, foreigners
were officially represented as a `temporary phenomenon'. Seasonal workers (figure 1) were
allowed to work in Switzerland only for a period of up to nine months and then they
were obliged to return to their countries. It was assumed that in the long-run, foreign
labourers would stay in their countries. Bringing in family members was possible
only after having worked for three consecutive years in Switzerland (Mahnig and
Piguet, 2003).
Besides the seasonal-worker status (half of the immigrants who entered Switzerland
at the time were seasonal workers), Swiss authorities created the one-year status, by
which foreigners were allowed to work in Switzerland over the entire year, but permit
renewal was made conditional on the c`ountry's economic situation', thus foreign
labour was used as an e`conomic buffer' during times of economic recession. Despite
these policies that were restrictive in terms of civil rights, Swiss authorities followed
a laissez-faire approach in terms of the numbers of foreigners that were allowed to
immigrate. Consequently, the numbers of foreign national increased significantly from
1950 to 1960 (table 1) (Mahnig and Piguet, 2003).
The Uë berfremdung ideology had a serious impact on restricting the access of
immigrants to formal citizenship. Whereas before the First World War two years
of continued residence had been sufficient to apply for citizenship, in 1952 a new
citizenship law (Bu« G) was passed that elevated the minimum number of residence years
to twelve (Federal Assembly of the Swiss Confederation, 1952). In addition, Article 14
of the law stated that citizenship could be granted only to immigrants who were able
to prove formally their cultural assimilation: that they were `` integrated into Swiss
society'', `` familiar with the Swiss lifestyle, morals and customs'', `` obedient to the
Swiss legal system'' and that they did ``not represent a danger to Switzerland's security.''
Figure 1. Italian seasonal workers traveling back home for Christmas, Zurich 1964 (source:
Archive Keystone, Zurich).
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This lawöstill in force in 2006öhas led to many arbitrary decisions, especially in the
past decade, when prejudiced views of immigrants of Turkish and Yugoslavian origins
have led to frequent refusals of their right to citizenship. Nowhere else in the world must
a request for citizenship be approved at three levels: municipal, cantonal, and federal
(Steiner and Wicker, 2004).
During the 1960s an economic situation of high prices and growing inflation,
accompanied by growing numbers of foreigners (table 1), introduced a renewed fear
of Uë berfremdung. The response of the government to this situation was to issue
consecutive decrees (in 1963, 1965, and 1967) ordering Swiss enterprises to reduce the
numbers of foreign workers and requiring them to obtain a permit before they could
enter the country. Such measures, however, failed to reduce the numbers of foreigners.
This phenomenon can be explained by Swiss firms' lack of interest in implementing
such measures, by an increase in family-reunification migration, and by foreigners
having a higher birth rate than that of the Swiss (Mahnig and Piguet, 2003). The issue
of increasing numbers of foreigners as a result of family reunification also became a
concern for other European countries such as Germany, France, and the United Kingdom,
and led to a progressive tightening of controls and limits on family reunification during
the 1970s and, later, in the 1990s (Kofman, 2004; Mahnig and Wimmer, 2000).
In 1964 the Italian government put increased pressure on Swiss authorities to
improve the precarious situation of the 346 000 Italian workers (table 2) living in
Switzerland. That same year the Swiss and the Italian governments signed an agree-
ment reducing the minimum numbers of years required for permanent residence from
ten to five and facilitating family reunion. Because the agreement applied only to
Italian workers, a system of civic stratification regarding immigrant rights was intro-
duced. The Swiss public saw in the agreement a danger of increased Uë berfremdung,
and a true media war took place. In fact, several organisations were founded at the
time with the explicit purpose of fighting the government's immigration policy and of
advocating a total stop to immigration (Misteli and Gisler, 1999). For the Swiss
public the government's policies had failed to address the problem of Uë berfremdung.
In 1965 the Democratic Party of Canton Zurich made use of Switzerland's system of
direct democracy to launch the first popular initiative against Uë berfremdung (a pop-
ular initiative gives citizens the opportunity to formulate their own proposals and put
them to the electorate). The initiative demanded that the constitution be changed to
include an article ordering the percentage of foreigners not to exceed 10% of the Swiss
population. The federal council agreed with the initiative that ``the high increase of the
total foreign population does bring the danger of foreign overpopulation'' (Feuille
fe¨de¨rale, 1967, page 91). However, the federal council also warned that the national
economy could not cope with the reduction demanded by the initiative (260 000
foreigners would have had to leave the country) and called the Swiss population to
reject it. The first popular initiative against Uë berfremdung was rejected.
In response to the Uë berfremdung initiative, the Swiss government issued decrees in
1968 and 1969 ordering further reductions in the percentages of foreigners working
in Swiss enterprises. These policies, however, remained ineffective and the percentage
of foreigners increased to 16% in 1969 (Federal Press, 1969, in Mahnig and Piguet,
2003). In 1969 the National Action Committee, an organisation created to fight the
excessive `alienisation' of Volk (the people) and Heimat (homeland), launched a second
initiative against the threat of Uë berfremdung. The demands of the `Schwarzenbach'
initiative (popularly so called after the man who was its main motor) were extreme.
No Swiss canton could have more than 10% foreigners among its resident population
(an exception was made for Geneva) and no Swiss citizen could be laid off as long
as there were foreigners working in the same enterprise within the same branch
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(Federal Press, 1969, in Mahnig and Piguet, 2003). The debate was extremely heated
and the media coverage exceptional. The Schwarzenbach initiative threatened to throw
Switzerland into a political crisis and the Swiss government reacted by warning that
accepting such an initiative would mean violating international pacts. Three months
before the Schwarzenbach initiative came to a popular vote (March 1970), the government
issued a new decree ordering the implementation of an annual quota on immigration.
The Schwarzenbach initiative was rejected by a meagre majority of 54% (six cantons
and two half-cantons accepted it) (Mahnig and Piguet, 2003).
The political turmoil that the Schwarzenbach initiative created was responsible for
the `stabilisation policies' that the Swiss government followed from that time onwards,
which aimed at introducing further restrictions on the rights of immigrants. Stabilisation
policies consisted of fixing an annual quota for the maximum number of economic
immigrants allowed into the country and restricting the civic rights of economic immi-
grants regarding their freedom to change job and place of residence (permission to
move from one canton to another was given only after having completed five to ten
years of uninterrupted residence) (Niederberger, 1982).
To the government's disappointment, despite stabilisation policies, the percentage
of foreigners continued to grow (table 1). In response, the National Action Committee
put forward a third initiative against Uë berfremdung in 1972. The initiative was, how-
ever, rejected by two thirds of the voting population and by every single Swiss canton.
The failure of the initiative of the third Uë berfremdung weakened xenophobic circles
and strengthened the government's stabilisation policies.
The economic recession of the 1970s triggered the end of seasonal-worker recruit-
ment, as it also did in Germany and Austria (Mahnig and Wimmer, 2000). By the
beginning of the 1980s the absolute numbers of foreigners in Switzerland had signifi-
cantly decreased (table 1). Among OECD countries Switzerland lost the most jobs, a
problem that principally affected foreigners. At that time, the majority of foreigners
living in Switzerland were only in possession of one-year permits (Haug, 1980, page 7).
By not renewing foreigner's permits, Switzerland was able to export its problems of
unemployment. Indeed, foreigners were used as an economic buffer during a time
of recession.
In 1981 new political actors emerged regarding the politics of immigration. The
Mitenand initiative, launched by a social movement based on solidarity with foreigners,
demanded the abolition of the seasonal-worker status, the automatic renewal of yearly
residence permits, and automatic family reunion (Mitenand, 1981). Economic sectors
and the government opposed the initiative because they realised the dependency of the
Swiss economy on guest workers. Specifically, the government feared that accepting
automatic permit renewal and family reunion would endanger stabilisation policies
based on temporary permits and postponed family reunion. The federal council advised
the Swiss public to reject the initiative (Mahnig and Piguet, 2003). The Mitenand
initiative was massively rejected by 85% of the voting population as well as by every
single Swiss canton. A year later, the government issued a special decree (BVO) on
the limitation of the numbers of foreigners which were allowed to enter the country
(Swiss Federal Council, 1986).
2.4 As of the 1990s: foreigners as `culturally close' or `culturally distant' to the Swiss
The 1990s were a period of rapprochement to Europe and marked the abandonment of the
seasonal-worker system. Stabilisation policies had remained unchanged until the 1990s.
Three new developments, however, started putting their e`fficiency' into question. First,
during 1989 and 1990, as the Spanish and Portuguese governments negotiated a reduc-
tion from ten to five years as the minimum residency for obtaining permanent status
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(Italy had already negotiated that right in 1964), an increasing number of foreigners
became permanent residents of Switzerland. Thus, the idea of using foreigners as an
economic buffer during times of recession no longer worked. Second, as civil war
broke out in Ex-Yugoslavia, the numbers of asylum seekers in Switzerland significantly
increased. This created a climate of public unrest. Stabilisation policies had not been
conceived for asylum-seeking immigrants and thus the government had no coherent
answer to the problem (Parini, 1997). Third, Switzerland's isolation from the EU was
seen with great concern by parts of the political elite (in December 1992 the majority of
the Swiss population refused by popular vote to join the EU). In their eyes, Switzerland
needed to develop closer links with the EU in order to ensure its economic future. They
saw that the conclusion of bilateral agreements on freedom of movement for Swiss
and EU nationals was a necessary measure to achieve this aim. The seasonal-worker
concept, as a foundation for policymaking, was no longer tenable for EU nationals.
In sum, stabilisation policies, as practised into the 1980s, were no longer adequate to
respond to Switzerland's new economic and political needs.
In response, the Swiss government created a commission composed of representa-
tives of the Federal Office for Industry, Trade, and Work (today the State Secretariat
for Economic Affairs) and the Swiss Federal Aliens Office to develop guidelines for a
new immigration policy. The commission's main question was how Switzerland could
move closer to the EU despite fears of Uë berfremdung among the Swiss population
(Mahnig and Piguet, 2003). The answer to this question was the `three-circle' policy.
Foreigners were conceptualised according to the idea of c`ultural proximity', which
attributed distinctive and differentiated qualities for foreigners according to their
country of origin. Thus, c`ulturally close' foreigners were defined as more likely to
integrate into Swiss society than c`ulturally distant' foreigners, who supposedly had
little chance of integration. Foreigners were divided into three groups: a first group
represented by an inner circle made up of EU nationals was defined as culturally
closest and thus should enjoy first immigration priority; a middle circle for nationals
from the USA and Canada, who, being `half-way' in terms of cultural distance, should
thus have second immigration priority; and a third circle, including `all other states',
which were defined as c`ulturally distant' to the Swiss and who were thus to be allowed
into the country only in exceptional cases (Federal Council, 1991; IMES, 2003a). The
Federal Council accepted the three-circle proposal to immigration in 1991. The deci-
sion was justified by explaining that it was necessary to formulate an immigration
policy that complied with the EU. Recruiting policies were thus directed to specific
countries and were based on ethnocultural stereotypes (Rohner, 1991).
From the beginning, the three-circle policy was widely criticised as being racially
prejudiced by progressive civil groups, such as charity organisations, immigrant
groups, and the newly created (1995) Federal Commission against Racism. Progressive
circles urged the Swiss government to revise immigration policies, to stop cultural and
gender discrimination, and to devise measures that helped improve the precarious
situation of many foreigners. Swiss firms also applied increased pressure for a more
liberal immigration policy, especially for highly skilled people from `Third World'
countries, particularly those skilled in information technology (Rian¬ o, 2003).
In 1997, as a reaction to increasing criticism, the Federal Council created a commis-
sion of experts to develop proposals for future Swiss immigration policy. The commission
proposed an immigration model based on the Canadian and Australian `point system'
whereby immigrants were no longer assessed on the basis of their nationality but were
assessed on the basis of their personal qualifications such as education, professional
experience, age, language knowledge, and professional adaptability (Commission d'experts
en migration, 1997; Federal Department of Justice and Police, 1998;Wimmer, 1997). In 1998
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the government accepted the proposal of the commission but did not introduce the point
system. In practice, the three-circle model was replaced by the `two-circle' model, which
improves the civic rights of EU immigrants, while at the same time authorizing the entry
of skilled immigrants from countries outside the EU. For the government, the two-circle
policy satisfied three aims: (a) to prepare the rapprochement to the EU; (b) to calm
xenophobic circles (under the assumption that European immigrants would no longer
create xenophobic reactions); and (c) to attend to the need of the economy for skilled
personnel from countries outside the EU (Mahnig and Piguet, 2003).
The conceptualisation of foreigners from the EU as superior, and the introduction
of a dual system of immigrant rights, was accentuated by the conclusion of the 2001
bilateral agreement between Switzerland and the EU on the free movement of individ-
uals (the Swiss population had accepted it by popular vote in 2000). From then
onwards, official discourse no longer defined EU nationals as foreigners. The agreement
gave EU nationals, in a system that is to be gradually introduced, the same living and
working rights as the Swiss, with the exception of voting rights (European Community,
2002). Thus, legislation on foreigners no longer applies to EU citizens but applies to
individuals from countries outside the EU. In 2004 the new `Foreign Nationals Act'
(Federal Assembly of the Swiss Confederation, 2002; IMES, 2004), which is to replace
the outdated 1931 Federal Law on the Residence and Settlement of Foreign Nationals
(ANAG), was submitted to the Swiss Parliament to make the `two-circle' policy official.
Thus, the proposed legislation governs the admission and residence of individualsö
who are not asylum seekersöoriginating from countries other than in the EU or the
European Free Trade Association. Foreigners were newly defined as nationals from
countries other than the EU. The term `third-nation foreigners' (Drittstaatenausla« nder)
was coined to designate such individuals. The new legislation exclusively restricts the
entry of non-EU immigrants to only those who are skilled personnel, who are con-
ceived as those required by the economy and more able to integrate into Swiss society
(a maximum quota of 2000 non-EU immigrants per year has been set).
This history of policies and official discourses on foreigners in Switzerland has
revealed two opposing trends. On the one hand, in the period of industrial expansion
before the First World War, foreigners were seen as indispensable for economic devel-
opment, and immigrant policies played a facilitating role or fulfilled a facilitating
function. On the other hand, after the First World War, a national c`ulture of threat'
developed in Switzerland and foreigners were represented as a danger to Swiss identity.
Policies were aimed at restricting migrants from full participation in society. During
the postwar period, as economic expansion required foreign labour, the government
introduced the seasonal-worker system, and foreigners were represented as a tempo-
rary phenomenon. In recent years, pressure to become increasingly integrated into the
EU led the Swiss government to adopt a more facilitating stance towards citizens from
the EU. Foreigners have been constructed as having differential qualities according to
their country of origin and level of skills. Table 3 (over) summarises the variety of
conceptualisation of foreigners in Swiss immigration and naturalisation policies.
Race, class, and gender have been central features in the structuring of Swiss state
discourses on immigrants. Racialisation, the practice of distinguishing certain groups
from others through the attribution of certain negatively evaluated features in order to
justify their exclusion from equal access to socioeconomic and political resources
(Kofman, 2004), has characterised Swiss immigration policies. The racialised represen-
tation of non-EU citizens as c`ulturally distant' and thus as less able to `assimilate' has
had the function of legitimising their exclusion from the right to immigrate and settle
and has validated the introduction of a dual system of immigrant rights giving priority
of admission and employment to EU citizens. Immigration legislation, as a means of
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the institutionalisation of racism, has also played a role, directly or indirectly, in other
countries. Selective admission policies in the USA before the 1960s led to predom-
inantly European immigrants (Leitner, 1995, page 261). Postwar policies in France
included a system of differential treatment based on nationality that granted Euro-
peans and citizens from former colonies privileged rights of settlement (Kofman, 2004).
Latin American descendants of Japanese emigrants (`Nikkeis') automatically qualify
for admission in Japan (Higuchi, 2003). In the United Kingdom, Baltic women were
constructed by postwar policies as superior to other economic migrants, and blacks
were constructed as inferior (McDowell, 2003). In Germany, ethnic Germans from
Eastern Europe and Russia have had privileged rights of entry (Kofman, 2004).
The recent emphasis of Swiss immigration policies on skilled immigrants has
introduced a differentiation of immigrants according to class. Despite Switzerland's
continued need for unskilled labour, skilled immigrants are now constructed as `the
ones that the economy needs' and as `more likely to integrate'. At the bottom of this
claim, which is also present in the policies of several other European countries, is the
assumption that unskilled immigrants are more vulnerable to unemployment and
constitute a burden for the state. Such a connection between immigrants' class and their
ability to integrate seems flawed. In Canada, a country that has long favoured skilled
immigrants, the latter are currently experiencing relatively high rates of unemployment
(Ruddick, 2004). It seems that as long as discrimination structures persist immigrants
will be at risk of unemployment whether they are skilled or not.
Gender has been another central feature in the structuring of immigration policies.
Foreigner policies were, until recently, exclusively formulated in male terms with an
underlying understanding that those who migrate are males and that women are
simply their appendices. The assumption that men are the breadwinners and that the
function of migrant women is to attend to their husbands and children has meant that
women who enter as part of family reunification receive residence permits to `reside
with their husbands' but not to work. Citizenship law has been guided by patriarchal
values of giving privileged rights to Swiss men. Until the late 1970s, for example, Swiss
men who married a foreign citizen were able to pass their Swiss nationality on to their
wives and children whereas the same was impossible for Swiss women.
Table 3. Conceptualisation of foreigners in Swiss immigration and naturalisation policies
(1850 ^ 2005).
Before the First World War
Liberal policies of admission Foreigners are necessary for economic development
Foreigners need to be citizens so that they can
assimilate
First World War to Second World War
ANAG law, 1931 Foreigners are a threat to Swiss identity
After the Second World War into 1980s
Guest-worker policy, 1950s Foreigners are a temporary phenomenon
Naturalisation law (Bu« G), 1952 Foreigners need to prove they have assimilated
before they can be made citizens
Quota policies, 1960s, BVO 1986 The number of foreigners needs to be controlled
Policy of exporting unemployment, 1970s Foreigners are useful as an unemployment buffer
1990s onwards
Three-circle policy, 1990s Foreigners’ qualities depend on their country of
origin
Bilateral agreements with the EU, 2002 EU nationals are no longer foreigners
New foreigners law (AuG) (proposed) Skilled foreigners are more able to integrate
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3 State construction of difference and the social integration of foreigners
What type of framework have the conceptualisations presented above produced for
the social integration of immigrants? State discourses regarding foreigners have
produced two types of framework for the integration of foreigners: a `facilitating'
one in the period before the world wars and a `constraining' one after the First World
War. Until recently, and similarly to Germany and Austria, immigrant policies in
Switzerland remained part of a way of controlling, rather than facilitating, admission
to the host society (Caroni, 2004; Ka« lin and Rieder, 1999; Leitner, 1995). Rather than
promoting social integration, immigration and naturalisation policies have produced
a framework which hampers the integration of immigrants as it is very difficult for
them, first, to change their foreigner status, because of restrictive naturalisation
policies; second, to achieve equal standing in society to Swiss citizens, because
Uë berfremdung and `ethnicised' discourses put a barrier between immigrants and native
populations; and, third, to have equal opportunities of access to a job or a place to live,
as temporary residence status and the priority given to Swiss nationals hinder equal
access. Recent discourses of cultural difference (such as `EU citizens and skilled
immigrants are more able to adapt to Swiss society') have legitimised a system of
unequal civic rights among immigrants, thus creating unequal opportunities for social
and economic participation.
The constraining approach to immigrant integration is a paradox when compared
with the role that foreigners play in Swiss society. Without immigrants Switzerland
would have a population of 5.2 million instead of 7.3 million (Haug, 2003). Today,
gainfully employed foreign nationals carry out one quarter of the entire volume of
work in Switzerland. In the hospitality industry, one out of two employees is a foreign
national. Homes for the elderly and hospitals in the city of Zurich employ people from
eighty-seven different nations. Without foreigners, the work of providing care and food
as well as cleaning and maintenance would be unthinkable (IMES, 2003b). Despite
this, the Swiss labour market is segregated along the lines of nationality and gender.
The unemployment rate for foreigners is three times higher than that of the Swiss
(Haug, 1998). Swiss men have the highest rate of economic participation, occupy the
highest ranking positions, and earn the highest incomes. The proportion of foreign
men with leading positions is higher than that of Swiss women. Foreign women are
lowest regarding occupational position, income level, number of working hours, and
employment stability. Swiss citizens hold a virtual monopoly on public sector jobs,
agriculture and forestry, and security services, and 60% to 80% of foreigners work
in the processing industry, construction, and services (mostly as cleaning personnel)
(Swiss Federal Statistics Office, 2001).
In recent years, however, there has been a growing awareness of the need to
improve the rights of immigrants. The late-20th century abandonment of the idea of
foreigners as `birds of passage', the growing percentage of second-generation and even
third-generation `foreigners', and the high levels of unemployment among foreigners
have led Swiss authorities to the realisation that foreigners need to become `integrated'
into the host society. The Swiss author Max Frisch (1965, page 7) appropriately put this
situation as follows: `` We called in a work force but human beings came.''At the federal
level, the principles and objectives of the integration of foreign nationals were, for the
first time, laid down in law by the Decree on the Integration of Foreigners, which came
into effect in 2000 (Swiss Federal Council, 2000). This decree made several significant
advances compared with past policies, as it no longer requires the `assimilation' of
foreigners, is aimed at creating an adequate climate of equal opportunities, and regards
integration as the joint task of society, federal, cantonal, and local authorities, and
immigrant organisations. Whereas this decree aims at improving the situation of
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foreign nationals with legal and permanent residence in Switzerland, there are no
parallel measures aimed at counteracting structural barriers to integration, such as
restrictive access to job opportunities, lack of recognition of foreign titles, and ethnic
discrimination. Several Swiss cantons have been active since the late 1990s in devising
and implementing integration measures at the local level (`Integrationsleitbilder ') which
have often had a more progressive content than federal policies. Their impact, however,
remains locally bounded. Further, structural barriers created by national legislation
cannot be taken down by local authorities.
Mahnig and Wimmer (2000) have noticed a convergence in recent European
policies towards improving immigrants' rights to gain better access to the labour
market and to educational opportunities as well as to improved information and
dialogue. This convergence is attributed to the fact that liberal democracies are having
increasing difficulty with the permanent exclusion of parts of their population. Soysal
(1994) has interpreted such policy changes as the response to an emerging transnational
regime of norms and rules. Despite convergence, an important difference persists
between European countries: the state's will to fight discrimination and to open public
institutions to immigrants. Whereas many measures to combat social discrimination
have been implemented in the United Kingdom, such measures do not exist in
Germany, France, and to a large extent in Switzerland. Although Switzerland imple-
mented an antiracism norm in 1995, and created in the same year the Federal
Commission against Racism, these measures do not seem to have had a significant
impact on everyday discrimination. Further, policies of opening public institutions to
immigrants do not exist and there are no equal-employment opportunity policies
prohibiting national origin-based, race-based, or religious discrimination like in
Australia, United States, and the United Kingdom. Mahnig and Wimmer explain the
differences in policies between European states as a result of each country's particular
history of society ^ state relations. For example, in Switzerland and Germany the state
is supposed to protect the interests of the national group it represents and not that of
other peoples who do not `belong' to the national family. According to the liberal
model of society ^ state relations in the United Kingdom, the state should provide an
even playing field on which different groups compete.
A further sign of the federal government's willingness to facilitate the integration of
foreigners into society was the plan for naturalisation that was submitted to popular
vote in September 2004. This proposed legislation was aimed at facilitating the
naturalisation of second-generation and third-generation foreigners. Three proposals
were submitted to popular vote: (a) facilitated naturalisation for young people of the
second generation; (b) great simplification of the time-consuming federal procedure;
and (c) naturalisation at birth for the third generation. The Non-partisan Committee
against Mass Naturalisations (behind which was the right-wing Swiss People's Party)
carried out an intensely xenophobic propaganda campaign to influence the Swiss
population to vote against the initiative. Using the slogan that `mass naturalisations'
would lead to an `Islamification of the country', they managed to frighten the Swiss
population (figure 2). The initiative was rejected by all Swiss cantons, except the
French-speaking cantons, and by 58% of the Swiss population. Thus, despite recent
openings by the state towards foreigners, as illustrated by the proposed legislation on
facilitated naturalisation, the fear of foreigners as a threat to Swiss identity continues
to be present among the Swiss population. Paradoxically, Switzerland remains more
restrictive in terms of naturalisation legislation than Germany, which had passed a law
on the facilitated naturalisation of second-generation foreigners in 1993 (Mahnig and
Wimmer, 2000).
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4 Building the nation, constructing difference, and the politics of identity
This section starts with the issue of why postwar constructions of immigrants have
produced such a strong differentiation between Swiss citizens and foreign nationals, a
differentiation that has hampered the social integration of foreign nationals. Several
authors have argued that national identities arise through discourses that emphasise
difference from other groups (Tabin, 2004; Valentine, 2001). In order to make that dif-
ference, however, a set of uniting common features needs to be available first. Indeed,
all nations are `imagined communities' (Anderson, 1991) and they have been con-
structed based on common uniting factors such as ethnic origin (Volksnation),
language, religion, and customs (Kulturnation) or civic values (Staatsnation) (Yuval
Davies, 1997). Switzerland does not fit any of these models because Switzerland has
been constructed as a state based on cultural diversity. The Swiss nation is made up
of four language groups (Swiss-Germans, Swiss-French, Swiss-Italians, and Swiss-
Romansh) with two different religious orientations (Catholic and Calvinist). The
constitution of the Swiss nation arose from the union of various local groups to fight
a common foreign enemy. As idealised in the legend of William Tell, local groups of
people in Switzerland closed a pact of mutual assistance in the 13th century to
struggle against the power of the expanding Habsburg family and gain independence
from them. This is seen as the beginning of the Swiss Confederation, and the myth of
Swiss identity has been constructed around it.
Interestingly, the original theme of resisting a foreign threat has persisted in
Swiss history as a uniting force. As we showed in section 2, nationalist groups have
used the idea of a foreign threat in the discourses of Uë berfremdung and Geistige
Landesverteidigung and used them to stimulate nationalist values and create national
cohesion. Sarasin (2005) has argued that the ultimate aim of the Geistige Landes-
verteidigung ideology was the generation of a c`ulture of threat' by which patriotic
Figure 2. Campaign poster against `mass naturalisations' by the Swiss People's Party, 2004.
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values and national identity could be fostered. The myth of `Swissness' had to be
constructed in order to create unity within the country and to represent Switzerland
abroad. Thus, the values of cultural diversity, democracy, and freedom were por-
trayed as `typically Swiss' and were used as a `positive' cultural reference against
the supposedly `negative' influences from abroad. The idea of `foreignness' as some-
thing negative and of `Swissness' as being `better than everything else' persisted in
Switzerland until the 1970s and has recently made a comeback with the rise of the
right-wing Blocher-lead Swiss People's Party aimed towards protecting the `old order'.
The conclusion from the discussion above is that excluding foreigners has had the
important function of maintaining Swiss identity. Right-wing circles have successfully
used antiforeigner discourses to coerce the government into implementing policies of
exclusion towards immigrants. Immigrant policies have thus become a means of protect-
ing national identity. It is ironic, however, that right-wing circles have been so successful in
influencing government policies despite the fact that the country's economic develop-
ment depends on foreign labour and that economic groups have an interest in using
foreign labour. Some authors (Mahnig and Piguet, 2003) have postulated that the
success of xenophobic circles is tied largely to Switzerland's system of direct democ-
racy. This system allows social groups to bring their agendas to the national level and
to make them the object of national debate. Submitting an initiative to popular vote,
public opinion can be oriented in a certain direction thus forcing the government to
respond. This thesis makes a lot of sense. The question nevertheless remains: how is it
possible that progressive groups, such as the Mitenand initiative in the 1980s, who also
used the system of direct democracy, remained unsuccessful in influencing state poli-
cies? Our proposal is that it is not the institution of direct democracy itself that
explains the success of xenophobic groups but the type of discourses that these groups
use. Uë berfremdung is a powerful discourse because it touches the very core of Swiss
identity. As it has long been argued, the concept of nation is the most important
instrument for building identity. The issue of immigration and Uë berfremdung threatens
the identity of the nation itself.
Uë berfremdung is a powerful discourse because of its simplicity. It creates a binary
opposition between nationals and foreigners by which nationals are constructed as
`normal' and `desired' and foreigners are constructed as `deviant' and `undesired'.
Uë berfremdung easily provokes fear, and thus public opinion and action can be
mobilised. Uë berfremdung produces an essentialist cultural discourse based on the
idea that when two cultures come together they do not mix but one dominates
the other. Policies of exclusion towards foreigners have created the paradoxical situa-
tion where, on the one hand, the Swiss state is founded on principles of `openness to
difference' and in particular to multiculturalism, while, on the other, when it comes
to immigrant populations, openness to difference and to multiculturalism no longer
exists. Wimmer (2002) has argued that Switzerland well illustrates the dialectics of
inclusion and exclusion: in order to insure and maintain the integration of Swiss
nationals into the nation and the economy the Swiss state had to devise policies of
exclusion towards foreigners.
The difference between immigration, immigrant, and naturalisation policies during
the prewar and postwar period can also be interpreted in light of the changing role of the
state. The idea of nationality was used in the 19th century to organise the state and to
support the development of productive capitalist forces. For capitalism to develop, the
nation-state and the idea of nationality were necessary. The expression of this con-
ception of state was Switzerland's liberal policy regarding the entry and naturalisation of
immigrants. Since the 20th century the idea of nationality has been increasingly used to
bind and articulate diffuse fears within society, which were generated by transnational
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mobility and by the increasing globalisation of the economy. The content and nature
of state discourses on foreigners in Switzerland has been tied to the country's process of
nation building. The politics of immigration in Switzerland can be interpreted as a
politics of national identity.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have attempted to unravel the largely unexplored history of the
discursive construction of foreigners by Swiss state policies from 1850 until today. State
representations of foreigners have shifted from a predominantly positive attitude
towards foreigners before the First World War to a mainly defensive attitude, which
partly persists today, where foreigners are conceptualised as a threat to Swiss identity.
Such conceptualisations have sustained and legitimised the socioeconomic conditions
of inequality of large numbers of immigrants. In the past decade, as a result of the need
to develop closer links with the EU, foreigners have been portrayed as having distinc-
tive qualities, and citizens of the EU have been represented as `more likely to integrate'.
Shifts in state discourses concerning foreigners have occurred as a response to both
economic and political interests such as economic growth, protecting the privileged
access of Swiss nationals to the labour market, and the protection of national identity.
Defensive attitudes and differentiations among foreigners have significantly influenced
the recruitment, residence status, and allocation to employment of foreign nationals.
Several events have influenced discourse shifts: the country's transformation from a
rural to an industrial economy, the outbreak of the two world wards, the postwar
economic growth, and the recent emergence of the EU. Several actors have influenced
the formulation of immigration policies including, most notably, national economic
groups, xenophobic groups (through Uë berfremdung initiatives), and foreign govern-
ments (through bilateral agreements). Xenophobic groups, working together with
right-wing parties, have been particularly successful in influencing the government in
formulating policies of exclusion towards foreigners. Centre-oriented and left-oriented
political parties in Switzerland have had an ambiguous position on foreigners. The left,
for example, has defended immigrants' rights while trying to attend to the interests of
the trade unions they represent, which are primarily interested in securing jobs for
their members and not in open policies of immigration.
The history of state discourses of foreigners in Switzerland is significant for con-
ceptualisations of citizenship, identity, and discourse. First, it brings to light some
shortcomings in the migration literature. Much of the recent literature, especially that
focused on Anglo-Saxon countries with jus solis as a principle of citizenship, has
dedicated a lot of attention to the issue of transnationalism. Researchers are noticing
the increasing transnational links in immigrant's lives and, as it is generally assumed
that nations represent the primary form of identification for their populations, they
are asking to what extent immigrants identify with the host country's national state.
The question is particularly pertinent if we consider the national context: in jus solis
countries it is relatively easy for immigrants to obtain formal citizenship. In jus
sanguinis countries, however, and particularly in the Swiss case, immigrants are kept
in a foreigner status for generations. This sets up a completely different context for
issues of transnationalism and the study of immigrant identities. In the Swiss case the
identification of immigrants with the national state of their host countries is not
encouraged. This means that the perspective of analysis for studies of transnationalism
needs to become more differentiated, looking at the variety of national contexts,
and at the influence that different regimes of citizenship have on the constitution of
immigrants' identities.
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Second, the particular construction of immigrants by the Swiss state reveals the
significance of the concepts of race, class, and gender for the understanding of state
discourse. The racialised representation of non-EU citizens as c`ulturally distant', and
thus less able to `assimilate', has had the function of legitimising their exclusion from
the right to immigrate and settle and has validated the introduction of a dual system
of immigrant rights giving priority of admission and employment to EU citizens.
The portrayal of skilled immigrants as `more able to integrate' has introduced a differ-
entiation of immigrants according to class. The representation of male migrants as
breadwinners and of migrant women as their appendices has confined women to the
domestic role and limited their access to the labour market. More empirical studies
showing the interconnectedness of race, class, and gender are necessary.
Third, Switzerland's story reveals the significance of state discourses on foreigners
for the construction of national identity. It has been argued that national identity is
produced through narratives of the `self ' and the `other'. Constructing `sameness' is a
challenge in Switzerland given its multicultural nature. By constructing foreigners as
a cultural threat, and by portraying Swiss values as something that needs to be defended
from foreign influence, state discourses have played a unique role in constructing and
maintaining national identity. Thus, while Switzerland has succeeded in building a
multicultural nation (made up of Swiss-Germans, Swiss-French, Swiss-Italians, and
Swiss-Romansh) it has also given a rise to a segregated relationship between nationals
and foreigners. The Swiss case also illustrates the extent to which geography matters
for the politics of national identity. Being a small country surrounded by four large
nations has led to a feeling of fragility and a fear of being `absorbed' by `others'. In the
Swiss case, and especially in times of uncertainty, the discourse of Uë berfremdung has
found a particularly fruitful ground to develop by making use of the analogy of a
small boat overcrowded by excessive numbers of foreigners. Lastly, Switzerland well
illustrates how contradictory the representations of a nation can be, depending on
geographical scale. At an international level, the Swiss state has succeeded in present-
ing Switzerland as a multicultural nation with a humanitarian tradition, but at the
same time, at a national level, it has applied restrictive citizenship policies that have led
to the social exclusion of its immigrants.
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